

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE FOR INSPECTION & SECURITY

SUBJECT: Security Survey -- Department of State Service Office -  
Government Printing Office

I. GENERAL

1. The survey reported upon hereinafter was predicated upon request of the Executive for Inspection and Security in a memorandum to Chiefs of Branches and Staff, I&S, dated 7 July 1947, subject: Projects, Plans and Policies.

2. Information was obtained through interview with Mr. Robert J. LeFebvre, Room 4 Basement, South Building, 25th and E Streets, N. W. Mr. LeFebvre is Chief of the Department of State Service Office and has acted in the capacity of Chief of Office under the various previous administrations of this activity. Information was also obtained from Mr. [ ] Chief, Reproduction Division, CIG, and from an inspection of the premises of the printing plant in South Building.

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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

3. The printing plant, identified as Department of State Service Office - Government Printing Office, engages primarily in composition, printing, binding, and photography. In its previous status the printing plant was set up as an emergency measure to print highly classified maps, plans, policies, and other documents for certain Federal departments and agencies. It was established as an activity of OSS by General Donovan who was instrumental in obtaining a war-time exception to the Federal law which requires that all Federal Government printing be done by the Government Printing Office.

4. The activity continued under the direction of OSS for the duration of World War II and until OSS was liquidated. In addition to OSS work the plant also served War Department, Department of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and Navy Department in the printing of highly classified matter.

5. When OSS was liquidated JCS, Admiral Leahy (White House), State, and War Departments (SSU) desired that the service be continued and considerable discussions transpired to determine which agency would assume responsibility for operations. Since approximately 80% of the work then being performed was for Department of State this agency took over control on 1 April 1946

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with the understanding that the arrangement might be changed when Central Intelligence Group was established. A short time later CIG became active and requested control of the <sup>shop</sup> job; State Department resisted and later agreed that the Bureau of the Budget should decide the matter. This Office (Bureau of the Budget) decided that Government Printing Office should operate the activity (thereby reestablishing compliance with the law) on a requisition basis, serving the printing needs of the Department of State, Central Intelligence Group, the White House, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other authorized departments and agencies. The Government Printing Office assumed jurisdiction on 1 February 1947 and since that time has been responsible for all administrative responsibilities.

### III. CIG SERVICE

6. Certain types of printing, particularly color work, maps, and layouts exceeding 22 inches in size must be performed for CIG by outside facilities. The subject plant is used exclusively for this work. When work is to be done a requisition form (GPO Form No. 3028) is completed in triplicate and submitted together with necessary drafts or copy to the Chief the GPO Office, or his assistant (Mr. Fred Drake). Such requisitions and material have in all cases heretofore been delivered in person by authorized CIG courier or messenger, by Mr. [ ] of the Reproduction Division, or an assistant duly authorized by Mr. [ ] At the time of delivery of the requisition order, which contains detailed information concerning the job, the order is dated and signed by the recipient and one copy returned to the CIG representative making delivery. Upon completion of the order, the finished product is returned to the appropriate CIG office by either a CIG or a GPO messenger or, in cases where the order is large or bulky, is returned by CIG or GPO conveyance accompanied by guards or messengers of one or both of these organizations.

7. In recent weeks the work performed on CIG requisition has comprised approximately 10 to 20 per cent of the total work performed by the subject GPO office.

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## IV. SECURITY PRACTICE

## 8. Personnel

a. The present personnel complement of the subject office is comprised of less than 40 persons. With one exception all have been the subjects of at least 2 loyalty investigations and have either been "security cleared" by CIG or are now in process of being so cleared. With the exception of one new employee added to the organization since it was operated by OSS all personnel were investigated by OSS and also by Department of State after 1 April 1946. Mr. LeFebvre reports that the CIG Security Division has "dossiers" on all personnel. All are considered completely loyal by Mr. LeFebvre.

## 9. Security Discipline

a. At the present time security policy and regulations prescribed by the Department of State are in force at the subject office, a hold-over from the time this Department exercised control.

b. Storage facilities of an approved type are amply available; there are 3 vaults, and 3-combination type safes in all rooms. All classified material is kept under 3-combination lock when not actually being worked upon.

c. At present entrance to the premises may be gained by two means -- the main basement door (loading dock) and the stairway from the first floor of the South Building. The latter means of entrance will be discontinued as soon as necessary building alterations are made. In the very near future use of the main basement door will be discontinued and a secondary basement door (more strategically located from the standpoint of security and provided with lock, heavy screen, and signal bell) will be put into use. A guard of long experience with the organization and well acquainted with all personnel employed meets all persons gaining entrance. He ascertains names, nature of business, etc. on all visitors and after checking with person with whom interview is desired escorts the visitor, if acceptable, to that person. After interview visitors

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are returned to the guard or to the entrance by the person interviewed. At the present time a CIG guard and receptionist check on all persons using the stairway to South basement. This procedure will be discontinued when the stairway is closed. The GPO guard maintains record of all visitors entering the premises.

d. Visitors are not permitted in any press room or work room. All customers or other visitors must discuss work changes or other matters in one of the two offices where all visitors are interviewed.

e. When it is necessary for maintenance personnel to enter the plant for repairs or installations all classified work is removed from view and workmen are kept under surveillance during their necessary stay.

f. When a requisition or work order is received in the plant a Job Production Report is immediately prepared and a copy of the requisition stapled to it. This report, approved by Government Printing Office and the Joint Committee on Printing, is so constituted that it provides a record of each job processed in the plant from exact time of its receipt until the completed order is delivered. While the form was designed primarily to furnish data from which to compile time studies, expenses, and changes to be made, it also serves as an effective security check inasmuch as it discloses each individual to which material is entrusted for necessary processing and the exact amount of time such material was in his possession. These forms may not be released since they disclose confidential methods of arriving at costs, but in event of a breach of security information from them might be made available for investigative purposes.

g. Mr. LeFebvre gives the impression of having a very clear conception of the necessity for strict security measures and seems to be exceptionally "security conscious". He stated that his former experience in security work with private drug manufacturing firms, the Chemical Warfare Service, the Army, G-2 of the War Department

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General Staff, OSS, and State Department has made him well aware of security needs and has developed his sense of security practice.

Mr. Fred Drake is the designated Safety and Security Officer for the plant and, according to Mr. LeFebvre, is a very alert and conscientious administrator of security measures. Mr. Julian McWhorter, Director of Field Operations, Government Printing Office, who is Mr. LeFebvre's superior, is also said to be a strong advocate of strict security measures.

#### V. SECURITY POLICY

10. During the course of discussion with Mr. LeFebvre certain significant questions were raised with respect to the advisability of resolving security policy for the plant at the earliest possible time. Mr. LeFebvre stated that, according to information furnished him by Mr. [ ] of CIG, there exists in writing an agreement providing for the formation of a committee to establish security policy for the subject activity, the appointed members being Mr. William Wright, Department of State, Chairman, Mr. Julian McWhorter, Government Printing Office, and Mr. [ ] Central Intelligence Group.

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Apparently this committee has never held a meeting. It is Mr. LeFebvre's opinion that efficient function of this committee would result in the most of resolution of his principal current problems. These problems result principally from a lack of formal guidance in such matters as acceptable practices in the use of forms, activity logs, receipts, etc; absence of uniform statements of requirements with respect to physical standards acceptable to all parties concerned (doors, guards, alarms, visitor control); and statements of provisions to permit discretionary flexibility in security measures to preclude retarding of operations through the interference of security bookkeeping.

11. ~~The~~ Specific instances of policy needs were suggested as follows:

a. The Atomic Energy Commission is the newest customer of the plant. Representatives of the Commission have asked for a "show-down" on the security policy of the <sup>shop.</sup> ~~job.~~ While the security is not directly questioned it is considered reasonable to expect that formal policies

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and regulations should be available for review in the security interest of the Commission.

b. Additional personnel is needed in the bindery if peak work loads are to be expeditiously handled. This additional personnel is not required at all times. It is believed advisable to establish a pool of personnel who have been cleared for loyalty and who may remain on a stand-by or on-call basis for immediate use when they are needed.

c. In the absence of definitely prescribed security regulations one agency having a contract in the plant insisted that <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ material be accompanied into the plant by two security officers and that these officers remain with the work during its entire processing. No objection was offered when this instance occurred, but the thought was suggested that the classified work of other agencies which may have been in process in the same press rooms could possibly have been compromised through its exposure to personnel of another agency even though these personnel happened to be authorized security officers.

d. The outstanding security need within the subject facility is for a uniform comprehensive security policy (with necessary implementation which would be acceptable to all users of the plant).

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

12. The subject facility is not provided with satisfactory security policy or with uniformly acceptable safeguarding measures applicable to <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ sensitive operations.

13. No serious threat to security appears to exist under the present Chief of Office. His personal knowledge and experience and his appreciation of responsibilities are responsible for the employment of adequate safeguards -- applied as circumstances appear to dictate rather than in compliance with strict procedural requirements and regulations.

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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

14. It is recommended that the agreement reported by Mr. LeFebvre as having been entered into by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Group (reference paragraph 10, Section V above) be examined and that, if this agreement is in effect substantially as it has been reported and is not contrary in other respects to the best interests of the Central Intelligence Group, a meeting of the designated committee members (or other authorized representatives) be called for the purpose of establishing appropriate security policies, measures, and procedures relating to the operations of the subject activity.

15. It is further recommended that representatives from the Atomic Energy Commission, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and any other appropriate using agencies be invited to participate in the considerations of the committee with a view toward adoption of policy and procedures satisfactory to all parties concerned.

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